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 1 
Introduction 
Is it possible to import democracy from the outside? The answer to this 
question is most likely a confident ‘no’ as regime change and subsequent 
democratic development are primarily internal processes shaped by 
domestic actors and long-term structural factors such as political culture and 
vibrant civil society, level of economic development and economic 
performance, geography and the presence (or absence) of natural resources. 
However, the answers to the question whether and how external factors 
influence the domestic processes of democratization might be less 
straightforward. On the one hand, it is difficult not to agree with views that 
most of the domestic politics has recently become internationalised in the 
context of our modern interconnected and interdependent world (Strange 
1992; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999; Collier 1991). On the 
other, however, it is extremely challenging for students of the international 
dimension of democratization to trace effectively the connections between 
external factors and domestic processes of political change and make 
theoretically sound generalizations across time and space. In other words, 
how can one extend the argument on the international dimension of 
democratization beyond the conventional view advanced in the 1980s that 
‘external actors tend to play an indirect and usually marginal role’ (Schmitter, 
P. 1986, p.5, in O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., and L. Whitehead (eds.)) in the 
processes of democratization?  
One of the more straightforward ways to take further the argument of 
external factors’ domestic influences is to narrow down the scope of analysis 
to one of the most visibly manifested processes of external-domestic 
interactions: democracy promotion. By applying various democracy 
promotion strategies external actors aim to induce democratising states to 
achieve democratic transition and consolidation. Thus, from the analytical 
point of view, the examination of the effects of democracy promotion is 
more feasible in comparison to, say, analyses of more indirect influences of 
the international context such as effects of globalisation and democratic 
diffusion. Democracy promotion activities are conscious and deliberate 
actions by the international actors to impart new mentalities, new 
institutions, and new codes of behaviour in a target country. Thus, in order 
to provide additional theoretical insights with regard to the international 
dimension of democratization, it is analytically worthwhile to treat the 
international context as a ‘global agent’ rather than an amorphous ‘structure’ 
with no central logic or leading actor. This article adheres to the agent-based 
view of democratization and its international dimensions, and asks: how and 
when do external factors influence domestic political change? 
Only a small number of studies attempted to answer these and other 
questions concerning the international dimensions of democratization 
(Whitehead (ed.) 1996 and 2001; Pridham 2001; Burnell 2000; Knack 2004; 
Scott and Steele 2005; Finkel et al. 2007). As McFaul points out, students of 
both international relations and comparative politics have devoted little 
effort into answering the question whether external factors influence 
democratization (McFaul 2007, p.45). A lack of systematic studies on 
external dimensions of domestic political change contrasts with rising 
popularity among the policy-makers around the world of the ‘new policy 
agenda’ – the linking of development aid to the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and good governance (Crawford 2001). Especially in the last 
decade, more and more world leaders have embraced the moral and security 
benefits of democracy as a system of government. In quantitative terms, vast 
funds are being spent in various democracy promotion projects. For 
instance, the USAID democracy and governance aid expenditures escalated 
from $128 million in 1990 to $817 million in 2003 (Finkel et al. 2007, p.414). 
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Funds for democracy assistance programmes increased 538 per cent 
between 1990 and 2003, as opposed to total USAID assistance, which 
increased only by 19 percent (ibid.). In recent years European bilateral 
donors have been also spending significantly more on foreign 
democratization aid. Thus, the UK has recently surpassed Germany 
(traditionally the most generous democracy and development donor) in 
democracy aid spending, and since 2001 has tripled its financial allocations 
for democracy aid (Youngs 2008, p.161). Germany’s funding for democracy 
and development of civil society increased from €180 million in 2000 to 
€410 million in 2006 (ibid.). The European Commission’s European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programme has also 
slowly grown from €100 million in 2000 to €135 million in 2007.1 Overall, 
both the U.S. and the EU spend roughly $1.5 billion a year on democracy 
promotion (McFaul 2007, p.47). 
Rhetorically, policy-makers around the world explicitly praise the virtues of 
democracy promotion and democracy protection in new, fragile states. On 
numerous occasions the EU has highlighted the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and good governance as strategic priorities.2 Likewise, the former 
American president George W. Bush emphasized promotion of democracy 
and freedom around the world as one of his top foreign policy objectives.3 
Thus, it is clear that democracy promotion remains to be at the top of 
foreign policy agendas of many leaders and policy-makers around the world, 
yet systematic assessments of effects of such activities are still 
underdeveloped in the scholarly literature.  
This article aims to contribute to the literature on the international 
dimension of democratization by analysing experiences of democracy 
promotion and its influences on domestic processes of political change in 
three post-communist states – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – in the period 
from 1991 to 2002. Specifically, the focus is on developments within a single 
policy sector: civil and political rights such as freedoms of media and 
expression. The paper’s analytical framework follows approaches recently 
advanced in the literature,4 which can be collectively referred to as an ‘inside-
out’ critical approach.5 The rationale for this novel approach is 
straightforward: in order to grasp fully the domestic effects of international 
democracy promotion the analysis should ‘zoom in’ first at the domestic 
context and identify a set of factors that account for democratization (or 
lack thereof), and then the focus should ‘zoom out’ in order to examine how 
external factors influence the value and structure of domestic factors 
                                                 
1 Annual Report 2007 on the European Communities’ Development Policy and the 
Implementation of External Assistance in 2006 (Luxembourg: European 
Communities, 2007), p.16. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/documents/annua
l-reports/europeaid_annual_report_2007_en.pdf.  
2 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a Better World: 
European Security Strategy (Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2003). 
3 George W. Bush, ‘President Sworn-In To Second Term’, January 2, 2005, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html as 
cited in McFaul 2007, p.46. 
4 See, for instance, McFaul, ‘Ukraine imports democracy: external influences 
on the Orange revolution’ and his discussion of merits of ‘zoom in – zoom out’ 
approach, pp. 45-83; see also Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta 2009, pp.3-19 and 
other articles in the special volume of Democratization, 16(1), 2009.  
5 Pace et al. acknowledge contribution of Frédéric Volpi in teasing out the 
‘inside-out’ framework of analysis. See Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta 2009, 
(note 3), p. 17. 
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(McFaul 2007, p.47). Thus, it is assumed that external actors can influence 
domestic political process only indirectly by working with and through 
domestic actors: for instance, by constraining autocratic actors and 
empowering pro-democratic forces. As McFaul concludes in the end of his 
‘zoom in -zoom out’ case-study analysis of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 
‘future case studies structured in similar ways might eventually contribute to 
theory development in this under theorized field’(ibid., p.82). By adopting 
this approach and extending the analysis to three under-researched country-
cases this article aims to contribute to further development of the theory on 
external dimensions of domestic political change.  
In general, post-Soviet states tend to be under-represented in the literature 
on the international dimension of democratization, partly because they are 
often regarded as either democratic ‘under-achievers’, or, in the worst 
scenario, as ‘hybrid regimes’ which combine elements of democratic 
procedures and largely pro-authoritarian practices (Diamond 2002). Usually 
these countries fall beyond the sphere of interest of the EU and other 
multilateral external actors and, as a consequence, they do not show clear 
links between the democracy promotion activities and domestic processes of 
democratization. However, examination of such cases is worthwhile as it can 
provide further insights to theoretical explanations of external actors’ effects 
(or lack thereof) on domestic political change and, in particular, the 
effectiveness of democracy promotion, even in the context of unfavourable 
domestic context. Therefore, applying existing theoretical and analytical 
frameworks to new and relatively unknown cases is useful for theory 
generation and development.  
Also, all three country cases present a number of interesting puzzles. Why, 
for instance, did the communist government in Moldova adopt most of the 
required human rights legislation within the first two years of its rule despite 
pessimistic predictions by media, opposition and scholarly community? Why 
did authorities in Ukraine suddenly adopt a number of important legislative 
acts such as the 1999 Framework Act on the Legal policy for the Protection 
of Human Rights and the 2001 Criminal Code after previously delaying the 
process for so many years? What can explain the degree of governmental 
response and timing of their policy decisions in these and other similar 
cases? On the other hand, what was it in the case of post-communist 
Belarus that made it so ‘immune’ to external interferences on the part of 
democracy promoters? Did external actors play any role in preventing 
consolidation of autocratic power in Moldova and Ukraine? If yes, how 
exactly were these effects produced? Why then were external actors 
powerless in Belarus? These are some of the empirical puzzles which this 
article attempts to answer.  
The article adopts a comparative case-study approach: it applies the same 
analytical framework and examines operation of two causal mechanisms – 
empowerment of democratic agents and external constraints on autocratic 
agents – across the three country-cases. The cases are comparable in a 
number of important respects. All three country-cases are post-Soviet 
republics which share similar historical and socio-economic legacies as well 
as similar transition problems. From the early 1990s all three countries had 
similar densities of ties to the West and all three have been subject to similar 
exposure to democracy promotion activities pursued by bilateral and 
multilateral external actors. Also, neither country has been very successful in 
its democratisation efforts so far.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, an analytical framework for 
analysing external and internal dimensions of domestic political changes in 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is discussed in detail. The second section sets 
out domestic context of regimes that emerged in Belarus, Moldova and 
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Ukraine in the 1990s – early 2000s. The third section examines the first 
causal mechanism – empowerment of domestic democratic agents by 
European organizations involved in each country. The fourth section 
analyses the second causal mechanism – imposition of constraints and 
weakening of autocratic agents by European organizations.  Finally, the 
article draws a number of conclusions and discusses some policy 
implications. 
 
The international dimension of democratization 
revisited: analytical framework 
Various attempts to explain and theorise about democratization and 
domestic political change have prompted several schools of thought, which 
offered their own approaches to studying conditions and ways in which two 
processes take place. Broadly speaking, all these approaches can be classified 
as either structural or agency-based approaches (Schmitz and Sell in Grugel 
(ed.), 1999, pp.23-42). The proponents of the former approach (Lipset et al. 
1993; Diamond 1992; Diamond 1996; Leftwich  1996; Helliwell  1994) tend 
to stress the importance of underlying structural conditions such as socio-
economic development and a high level of modernization for a successful 
process of democratization. The advocates of the agency-based approaches 
(Karl 1990; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.) 1986; Di Palma 
1990; Przeworski 1986 and 1991) have seriously challenged the structuralist 
school by questioning a number of democratic transitions from the 1960s 
and 1970s, which failed to follow the democratization scenario even if the 
important structures did exist. Instead, they offered a new, micro-level 
perspective on democratization, emphasizing the role of domestic actors, 
their preferences and reactions to existing institutional constraints in 
determining the pace and character of democratisation. However, despite 
fundamental theoretical differences between these two approaches, both 
‘had in common a conviction that external factors were not of significant 
importance’ (Youngs 2001, p.4). Only recently have the scholars of 
democratization began paying more attention to the role of external 
variables in influencing domestic political change. These studies posit that 
the so-called international dimension should be incorporated into any 
explanation of democratization or, indeed, regime change processes, and 
that external factors such as democratic diffusion and pressures from 
international organizations can also foster domestic democratic 
development (Whitehead (ed.) 1996 and 2001, Whitehead 1999, Pridham, 
Herring and Sanford (eds.) 1994; Gleditch 2002; Pevehouse 2002 and 2005). 
Despite increased scholarly interest in international factors of 
democratization, the literature on its international dimensions remains to be 
limited in a number of important respects. First, there are still very few 
quantitative cross-national studies that measure effects of external factors on 
domestic democratic change (Knack 2004, Scott and Steele 2005, Kurtz and 
Barnes 2002, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Linán, Mitchell A. Seligson 
2007). However, as Pevehouse notes, the macro-oriented nature of these 
statistical tests makes it difficult to identify the particular causal processes 
behind the correlations of the data (Pevehouse 2005, p.111). Second, most 
of the qualitative studies on effects of democracy promotion also have a 
number of deficiencies. Perhaps, the most substantive criticism concerns a 
lack of theory as both a foundational basis and a final finding: most of these 
studies rarely go beyond descriptive analysis, tend to focus on a single case 
in terms of either the promoter or the promoted, and seldom draw on well-
established theories of international relations or comparative politics. For 
instance, often the research on the role of international organisations in 
democratization tends to focus on a single institution and the particular 
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strategy it applied (Kelley 2004a, p.425). Thus, a considerable body of 
literature analysed the effects of the EU conditionality on general trends in 
the democratization process and, in particular, on specific domestic policies 
of the Central and East European candidate states (Henderson (ed.) 1999; 
Grabbe and Hughes 1998; Dimitrova (ed.) 2004). These studies, however, 
seem to disregard the vast diplomatic efforts of other international and 
regional organizations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as 
influential bilateral organizations such as USAID and DFID, that have been 
actively involved in the region.  
Also, as McFaul points out, most studies on effects of democracy 
promotion (Ottaway and Carothers  2000, Henderson 2003, McDonagh 
2008) usually begin by focusing on some component of democracy 
assistance from a democracy promoter, such as political party assistance, 
rule of law programmes, civil society development or human rights reforms 
(McFaul 2007, p.46). This approach is methodologically flawed as ‘tracing 
the causal effect of one kind of foreign assistance on one dimension of 
democratic development in isolation from other variables influencing 
democratization is extremely difficult, while making impossible evaluations 
of progress toward democracy at the national level’ (ibid.). In order to 
effectively trace the impact of all democracy promotion activities that took 
place in a country one should focus analysis on both suppliers (democracy 
promoters) and consumers (domestic actors interacting with democracy 
promoters) in the democracy promotion process as domestic actors are the 
primary agents of political change and external actors ‘can influence 
outcomes only by working with and through these domestic actors’ (ibid., 
p.47). 
Overall, previous studies on democracy promotion have not been 
particularly optimistic about the beneficial effects of democracy promotion 
on target countries (Scott and Steele 2005, 2006; Knack 2004; Youngs 2001 
and 2004). However, as Finkel et al. indicate, despite somewhat pessimistic 
findings, it is premature to draw negative conclusions about the impact of 
democracy programmes (Finkel et al. 2007, p.414). Firstly, more theoretically 
grounded assessments of democracy promotion are needed. Often existing 
arguments on effects of democracy promotion are not linked to broader 
theories of democratization. The article addresses this particular issue below. 
Secondly, more systematic comparative studies (large- and small-N) are 
necessary in order to trace more effectively the connections between 
external democracy promotion programmes and domestic processes of 
political change and to produce more generalizable results. 
This article draws on theoretical micro-explanations of democratization that 
emphasize the role of human agency (elite-driven or mass-pressured), 
institution-building, actor constellations and formation of preferences and 
strategies that affect the dynamics and trajectories of domestic political 
change (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Casper and Taylor 1996; Higley and 
Burton 2006). The paper follows Finkel et al.’s approach and perceives 
democracy promotion as ‘an externally driven, agent-based influence on 
democratization’ (Finkel et al. 2007, p.411). In addition, this paper’s 
argument is based on those theories of democratization that view conflict as 
a driver of domestic change towards democracy and ascribe coordinated, 
non-violent mass opposition a significant role in weakening autocratic 
agents and, in some cases, even overthrowing authoritarian regimes 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Weingast 1997; Karatnycky and Ackerman 
2005; Ulfelder  2005; Welzel 2007). These theories of democratization argue 
that the impetus for domestic political change towards democracy occurs 
not when the distribution of power between the incumbents and potential 
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challengers is equal, which, in turn, incites both sides to compromise and 
negotiations, but when various societal forces, including the broader public, 
become powerful enough (through mass mobilisation and acquiring of 
various action resources) to either demand more democracy or protect it 
against authoritarian backslide.  
Building on this literature, the paper follows McFaul’s approach and treats 
distribution of power between autocratic elements within the ruling elite and 
pro-democratic elements within society (or, in other words, ‘challengers’) as 
a set of independent variables for explaining domestic political change 
(McFaul 2007, p.51). The political power of autocratic ruling elites is 
conceptualised in this article as the unity among the ruling elites and their 
capabilities to control the state, the coercive capabilities of the regime, and 
the costs of retaining autocratic rule. The power of challengers is measured 
in a similar vein: the unity of the opposition and the opposition’s capacity to 
oppose authoritarian practices, including the access to various collective 
action resources and the ability to organise effective collection action.  
Thus, the main aim of the empirical part of this article is to analyse shifts in 
the distribution of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic 
challengers in the three country-cases during the period under investigation. 
Influences of external actors on such distribution of power and its major 
shifts will also be analysed. More specifically, the article contends that 
external actors engaged in various democracy promotion activities influence 
domestic processes of political change through two causal mechanisms: first, 
through weakening and constraining of autocratic agents (the ‘constraints’ 
mechanism), and, second, through strengthening and empowering of 
democratic agents (the ‘empowerment’ mechanism). The first mechanism operates 
when external democracy promoters impose various constraints on non-
compliant authorities in a target country and, thus, weaken their power base 
and capacity to maintain the status quo. This is usually achieved through the 
use of negative conditionality: offer of negative incentives (various sanctions 
as well as explicit threats to impose these sanctions) in order to change a 
target state’s behaviour. As Burnell puts it, ‘the introduction of a 
requirement which makes offers of such support contingent on certain 
democratic and human rights conditions being met, and the exercise of 
conditionality – the reduction, suspension, withdrawal or termination of 
financial and economic assistance when a government’s conduct is judged 
unsatisfactory – elaborate the negative aspect’ (Burnell 2000, p. 8). Typical 
conditionality tools used by democracy promoters include gate-keeping in 
order to delay deeper co-operation process and signing of an enhanced 
association agreement; imposition of trade barriers and embargos; 
suspension or withdrawal of aid; strict benchmarking and monitoring such 
as evaluation of compliance in regular reports, official requests for policy 
change that provide explicit deadlines for governmental action or 
introduction of external sanctions; suspension of dialogue and interaction 
with authorities of a target country.6 
The second mechanism operates when external democracy promoters aim at 
teaching and socializing domestic actors into democratic norms and 
practices. This can be achieved via either normative persuasion (teaching, 
convincing, arguing), or social influence (imposition of social rewards and 
punishments) of domestic actors, or through both processes. Essentially, as 
Flockhart notes, persuasion is ‘a process of convincing someone through 
argument and principled debate’ (Flockhart in Flockhart (ed.) 2005, p. 49), 
whereas the social influence mechanism as ‘a class of micro-processes that 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed list of institutional tools associated with conditionality 
see McDonagh 2008, p.146. 
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elicit pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and 
punishments’ (Johnston 2001, p. 499). Notwithstanding these nuanced 
differences between the two socialization processes, the main aim of 
democracy promoters here is to empower pro-democratic agents within 
governments and societies of a target country, or to strengthen potential 
challengers (i.e. domestic opposition forces) of pro-authoritarian 
incumbents. Institutional tools associated with empowerment and 
socialization of pro-democratic domestic agents usually include official 
statements and declarations expressing opinions on a target country; 
guidance and argumentation in written follow-up reports from fact-finding 
visits; missions in the field and ad hoc visits; project based aid and technical 
assistance; legal expert teams to guide and advise policy as it is forming; 
provision of recommendations that outline general standards for laws; 
twinning and training of public servants and politicians as well as of 
representatives of media and civil society.7  
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note two important 
methodological caveats. First, democracy promotion activities are defined in 
this article as effective if they produce a desired result – further democratic 
advance in a target country. More specifically, a certain democracy 
promotion activity can be evaluated as effective if a target country 
undertakes a pro-democratic policy change after interaction with a European 
organization.  Such conceptualisation of effectiveness is especially useful for 
empirical analysis because it contains clear benchmarks (‘interaction with an 
external actor’ and ‘policy change’) for sorting out effects produced by 
international democracy promoters on the domestic scene from the 
influences of other factors, including domestic. Second, the article seeks to 
analyse and explain target governments’ policy behaviour in the field of 
freedoms of media and expression. For reasons of consistency and 
parsimony of analysis the article examines governments’ behaviour in 
respect of the policy rather than government’s change of beliefs, preferences 
and identity.8 Specifically, the focus of inquiry is on governments’ legislative 
compliance with international human rights standards and recommendations 
of external democracy promoters. One important advantage of such 
approach is that focus on legislative behaviour provides a consistent and 
parsimonious dependent variable that is easily identifiable when collecting 
and analysing the data. This approach does not downplay the importance of 
implementation in the policy process. Rather, adoption of necessary 
legislation is viewed in this article as a crucial policy stage that precedes the 
implementation stage. Hence, positive legislative changes can be perceived 
as a policy progress in the right direction. The next section sets out the 
domestic contexts of political regimes in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in 
the 1990s-early 2000s. 
 
Setting the domestic contexts: degrees of 
authoritarian power in Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine 
In the early 1990s all three post-Soviet states embarked quite swiftly on the 
journey of democratization and economic liberalization, but by the mid-
1990s most of these processes have ran into ground. There is a certain 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed list of institutional tools associated with democratic 
socialization and empowerment see McDonagh 2008, p.146 
8 A number of scholars have indicated that using behaviour as a dependent 
variable has a number of advantages for the analysis of institutional effects 
in the domestic arena (see, for instance, Checkel 1999 and 2001; Kelley 
2004a and 2004b; Johnston 2001). 
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consensus in the literature with regard to treating most of the post-Soviet 
states (with the exception of the Baltic states) as not transitory or 
democratizing states, but as a distinct type of regime, which was labelled by 
various scholars differently: a ‘hybrid’ regime, ‘pluralism by default’, regimes 
with ‘feckless pluralism’, ‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Diamond 2002; 
Carothers 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). All these and other labels mean 
more or less the same: these are regimes that combine nominal democratic 
procedures such as regular elections and elected government officials, with 
authoritarian features such as excessive centralisation of power by the 
executive and clampdown of opposition forces. Interestingly, in such 
regimes even though democratic institutions may be highly flawed, both 
authoritarian incumbents and their opponents tend to take them quite 
seriously (Levitsky and Way 2002, p.52). Thus, each electoral cycle, during 
which both autocratic incumbents and challengers must compete for power, 
represented a certain degree of uncertainty and could potentially change the 
balance of power in favour of the challengers. Early post-communist 
competitive politics in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine was not caused by 
strong civil societies, strong democratic institutions or skilful democratic 
leadership, but it was caused primarily by the inability of incumbents to 
maintain power or concentrate political control (Way 2005, p.232). 
Indeed, most of the first post-communist elections in Ukraine, Moldova 
and, to a lesser extent, in Belarus were bitterly fought. Moldova suffered 
from unstable government coalitions and subsequent frequent changes in 
government, even between elections. Moldova has had 6 prime ministers in 
the period from 1990 till now. The former prime-minister, Vasile Tarlev, 
had the longest ‘political life-span’ – 7 years in power (2001-2008). Both 
parliamentary and presidential elections have been bitterly contested, 
bringing to the political scene new presidents and causing considerable 
changes in the party and ideological composition of the parliament. For 
instance, the 1994 parliamentary elections brought a new Agrarian 
Democratic Party to power and the president Mircea Snegur lost his office 
to the head of the legislature, Petru Lucinschi, in 1996. Similarly, in Ukraine, 
elections in the 1990s often created uncertainty and were considered by 
political elites as the main means of gaining and preserving power. In the 
1994 parliamentary elections the incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, 
has lost to a challenger, Leonid Kuchma. Subsequently, Kuchma himself 
faced strong electoral challenges from the leftist opposition parties and won 
only 35 percent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary elections and 56 
percent in the second round. Even Belarus in the early 1990s went through a 
period of extensive political liberalization and increased political 
competition, which came to end after the November 1996 constitutional 
referendum that gave the president Lukashenka extensive powers to control 
practically all state institutions, including the judiciary, local governments, 
and even the legislature. So, during the first half of the 1990s there was no 
unity among the ruling elites as such because, frequently, the challengers to 
incumbents came from within the ruling camp, not outside of it.  
The incumbent capabilities to control the authoritarian state were also 
limited. In the early and mid-1990s all three countries suffered from 
inefficient state institutions both at the central and local level. As Way points 
out, often such weaknesses of vertical control caused by failure to pay 
salaries or subsidies to local governments, undermined capacity of 
authoritarian leaders to control political dynamics in the regions (Way 2005, 
p.249). In addition to the management and fiscal problems coercive 
capabilities of ruling elites were also undermined. Incumbents in all three 
countries on several occasions found it difficult to persuade security officials 
to contain opposition. In Ukraine, for instance, President Kravchuk had to 
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abandon plans to dissolve the parliament in January 1994 after the Minister 
of Interior disagreed with him (ibid.). The fact that incumbents were not 
capable to effectively control the state also meant that electoral manipulation 
by incumbents was a much more difficult task in the early and mid-1990s 
than in the late 1990s. Thus, during this period elections in Moldova and 
Ukraine were generally considered as free (that is, without falsification of 
election results) but not very fair as some international observers report 
irregularities prior to the elections such as unequal campaigning 
opportunities and bias of the electoral code rules in favour of the 
governmental party.9  
The incumbent capabilities to control the pace of economic reforms as well 
as the size and level of development of a country’s economy are also 
important factors influencing degrees of authoritarian power in the three 
countries. As Way points out, greater scope of state power over the 
economy makes it easier for autocrats to prevent the emergence of 
opposition as the private sector is weak or non-existent. Similarly, the size of 
the economy affects the degree of incumbent exposure to Western pressures 
for democratization (Way 2005, p. 235). Indeed, these two factors also 
account for differences in the degree of authoritarian power across the three 
cases. In the first half of the 1990s Moldova managed to conduct a number 
of market-oriented reforms earning ‘a reputation as one of the leading 
reformers in the region’ (Hensel and Gudim in Lewis (ed.) 2004, p. 89). As a 
result of these reforms, Moldova’s private sector is estimated at around 80 
per cent of the official GDP dominating in the services sector and 
agriculture (ibid.). Similarly, the Ukrainian authorities also embarked on 
extensive programmes of privatization that reduced the scope of direct 
government control over significant parts of economy and made it harder 
for incumbents to prevent elite defection and emergence of opposition (Way 
2005, p. 250). As McFaul points out, Ukrainian oligarchs never united in 
support of the ancien régime: the three largest oligarchic groups did back 
President Kuchma, but thousands of smaller businesspeople supported 
various opposition forces, including growing in popularity Prime Minister 
Yushchenko (McFaul 2007, p. 53). In contrast, privatization reforms in 
Belarus under Lukashenka were more restricted and, thus, the scope of the 
state power in the economy was much greater than in Moldova and Ukraine. 
Strict state control over the economy made it easier for Lukashenka to 
consolidate authoritarian control as opportunities and resources for elites to 
defect were very limited.  
In terms of the size and level of development of economies, there were 
important differences among the three countries. Moldova had the lowest 
GDP per capita: by 1997, it was poorer than any other country in Central 
Europe, even Albania, and poorer than any former Soviet republic except 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with a per capita GDP of $ 527. According to the 
World Bank,10 Moldova’s real GDP fell on average by 10 per cent per year 
through the 1990s. Despite high levels of competitiveness caused by 
ambitious privatization programmes, the Ukrainian economy was not very 
developed either: in 2003 its GDP per capita measured at $1,133 (Way 2005, 
p. 242). Ukraine’s economy began to grow in 1999 for the first time since 
independence, but Kuchma never managed to establish the state control 
over rents generated from gas and oil sales that could have been used to 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Freedom House’s ‘Nations in Transit’ Report for 
Moldova and Ukraine, 1995 and 1996 respectively, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 1 May 2009. 
10 See the World Bank data on Moldova, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org.md , accessed 1 May 2009. 
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purchase the loyalty of potential challengers. In contrast, the Belarusian 
economy was developing at a faster rate: by 2003 its GDP grew to $2,248 
per capita (ibid.). In addition, the authoritarian regime under Lukashenka 
benefited from significant energy subsidies provided by Russia: Belarus paid 
two or three times less for gas than Ukraine and Moldova (ibid.). This has 
made the authoritarian regime in Belarus less susceptible to Western 
pressures to democratise, and elite defection was less likely in the context of 
a strong and well-sustained authoritarian state. 
As this section has shown, political regimes developed in Moldova, Belarus 
and Ukraine in the 1990s cannot be characterised as transitory or 
democratising states. Rather they were regime types in themselves that 
combined nominal democratic features and largely authoritarian practices. 
The degree of authoritarian power also differed across the cases: Ukraine 
and Moldova being more competitive and, hence, less authoritarian, whereas 
Belarus by the end of the 1990s developed more or less full 
authoritarianism. The main factor that accounts for such differences is the 
political power of authoritarian incumbents conceptualised as the unity 
among the ruling elites and the incumbent capacity to control the state and 
the economy. Increased political power of authoritarian incumbents 
inevitably led to autocratic consolidation and weakening of the opposition. 
This is exactly what happened in Ukraine and Moldova in the early 2000s, 
when presidents Kuchma and Voronin, respectively, managed to consolidate 
their powers and, thus, strengthened the authoritarian regimes. Did external 
actors play any role in preventing autocratic consolidation in these 
countries? What were the effects of their democracy promotion strategies? 
And more importantly, how and when were they effective?  
 
Empowerment of pro-democratic agents and 
challengers: the role of European organizations 
As indicated in the last section competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and 
Ukraine gradually turned into more authoritarian by the end of the 1990s-
early 2000s. Paradoxically, Moldova became more autocratic after it was 
transformed into a parliamentary republic and a highly cohesive and 
centralised Communist Party came to power after winning 70 percent of 
seats in 2001. Ukraine also became more autocratic in the first decade of this 
century. President Kuchma managed to strengthen control over parliament 
and instituted a systematic electoral manipulation and intimidation of the 
opposition. By 1997 President Lukashenka established a highly closed 
regime with façade institutions that were totally controlled by the state.  
It is noteworthy at this point that throughout the 1990s out of the three 
organizations under consideration only the CoE and the OSCE were 
involved in promoting freedoms of media and expression in the three 
countries under consideration. The EU’s involvement was limited: by the 
mid-1990s it concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) 
with Ukraine and Moldova (but not with Belarus), but the emphasis was 
initially put on economic rather than political cooperation. The EU did not 
set up any special programmes for promoting respect for civil and political 
rights either.11 The main aim of the OSCE’s and the CoE’s democracy 
promotion activities was to empower pro-democratic domestic agents via 
adoption of specific legislation on freedoms of media and expression, and 
                                                 
11The EU’s sole assistance programme specifically directed to protect and 
promote human rights in target countries, EIDHR (European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights), was established in Ukraine and Moldova in 
1999. In 2006 the EIDHR was renamed into European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights. 
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via socialization of domestic actors into democratic practices (McDonagh 
2008, pp.149-150). For instance, in the 1990s the CoE initiated two co-
operation programmes in Moldova: on legal assistance and freedom of 
expression and media. The main institutional tools used by organizations 
during this period were organization of training courses, workshops, 
seminars and conferences with the participation of Moldovan journalists and 
lawmakers, and the CoE experts; and provision of written legal expertise on 
proposed legislative acts and drafts. Similarly, the OSCE’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) also undertook 
various activities aimed at empowerment of democratic agents: throughout 
the second half of the 1990s ODIHR has organised a number of seminars 
for Moldovan journalists and representatives of NGOs, dispatched legal 
expert assessment and review missions including assistance in the drafting of 
laws and practical management training for the constitutional court.12  
Similarly, despite delays in formalising relations between the CoE and 
Ukraine,13 the latter has been taking part in various democracy promotion 
activities activities of the CoE since 1992: Ukraine participated in various 
intergovernmental co-operation and assistance programmes on legal reform 
and human rights, and it also had a special guest status in the Parliamentary 
Assembly and a number of the CoE committees. Within the year of 
accession to the CoE, Ukraine was obliged to adopt a number of important 
legislative acts, among which were a framework-act on the legal policy of 
Ukraine for the protection of human rights, a new criminal code and code 
of criminal procedure, a new law on elections and a law on political parties.14 
For its part, the CoE committed itself to continue providing support to 
Ukraine through intergovernmental co-operation and assistance 
programmes in order to facilitate reforms in various areas, including 
freedoms of media and expression.  
The main aims of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator established in Ukraine in 
1999 were to assist the Ukrainian authorities in adapting legislation, 
structures and processes to the requirements of modern democracy via the 
organisation of various projects with relevant political actors in Ukraine.15 
However, if measured in quantitative terms, the scale of the OSCE’s 
democracy promotion activities was not very significant. In the period from 
1999 to 2004 only 12 projects were initiated between the OSCE and 
Ukraine, out of which only three projects were related to promotion of 
freedoms of expression and media.16 In the same period the OSCE’s 
average budget for Ukraine comprised only about € 1,300,000 per annum.17 
The EU’s EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) 
                                                 
12 See the 1995 and 1997 Annual reports on OSCE activities, OSCE, 
Vienna, available at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/show_publication.php?a=1&grp=193&l
imit=6&pos=0 , accessed 10 April 2009. 
13 Ukraine has applied for the CoE membership in July 1992, and has been 
accepted into the CoE only 3 years later, in November 1995. 
14 See PACE’s Opinion No.190 (1995), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta95/EOPI190.htm, 
paragraphs 5 and 11, accessed 15 March 2009. 
15 See the official web site of the OSCE’s Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine: 
http://www.osce.org/ukraine/, accessed 28 January 2008. 
16 These three projects were: a comprehensive review of human rights 
legislation, provision of technical and practical support to the Ombudsman, 
and a project on promoting freedom of the media.  
17 See the official web site of the OSCE’s Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine: 
http://www.osce.org/ukraine/, accessed 28 January 2008. 
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programme was established in Ukraine in 1999. The EIDHR was designed 
to influence governments in target countries primarily through indirect 
means by working with local NGOs and other organizations of civil society, 
and thus, aiming at empowerment of non-state actors whose main task 
would be to check and balance the state power.  
Did these democracy promotion activities aimed primarily at the 
empowerment of democratic agents and their socialization into democratic 
practices have any positive effects at development of freedoms of media and 
expression in Ukraine and Moldova? The next section addresses this 
question in greater detail. Before proceeding with analysis, however, it is 
necessary to pay greater attention to establishment of relations between 
Belarus and European organizations – mainly, where did it all go wrong? 
The early years of independent Belarus promised quite good prospects for 
establishing relations between Belarus and the three European 
organizations. In February 1992 Belarus acceded to the OSCE, and in 
August of the same year it established diplomatic relations with the EU. In 
September 1992 Belarus gained ‘special guest’ status in the CoE, and in the 
same year became a member of a number of International Financial 
Institutions such as IMF, EBRD, and the WB. The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Belarus was one of the 
earliest signed in comparison with other post-Soviet countries – in March 
1995. However, the first signs of the CoE’s dissatisfaction with the pace and 
quality of reforms in Belarus were shown after the 1995 parliamentary 
elections, when the CoE’s Secretariat was instructed to continue co-
operation with Belarus but to place increased emphasis on media freedoms 
(Wieck in Lewis (ed.) 2002, pp. 262-63). However, at that stage the CoE still 
opted for those democracy promotion activities that aimed at empowerment 
of domestic democratic agents: the main goal was ‘to teach and convince’ 
the Belarusian authorities of the virtues of democracy and the necessity to 
respect human rights, including civil and political rights. In early 1996 the 
Inter-Ministerial Council for Co-operation between Belarus and the CoE 
became fully operational and it had one main task – to bring Belarusian 
legislation into conformity with the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Also, several teaching and training initiatives were undertaken in the 
field of rule of law and support for NGOs (ibid., p. 263). Only after 
Lukashenko went ahead with the referendum on constitutional changes on 
24 November 1996 and, essentially, imposed a new, authoritarian 
constitution on the country, the CoE’s democracy promotion approaches 
have changed from indirect empowerment of democratic agents to 
imposition of explicit constraints on autocratic incumbents: it suspended 
Belarus’s special guest status on 13 January 1997. The other two 
organizations, the EU and the OSCE, largely echoed the CoE’s actions. The 
extent and effects of these constraints will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
 
External constraints on autocratic incumbents 
Despite explicit rhetoric that the authorities were working on civil and 
political rights reforms by the end of the 1990s it was clear that no real 
progress was made either in Moldova or in Ukraine. By 2000 Moldova still 
lacked legislation that would guarantee and protect freedoms of expression 
and information including new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, 
Civil Code, Law on Press, Law on National Broadcasting Company. 
Moreover, the draft Penal and Civil Codes, which the national legislature 
approved on several occasions during 1997 – 2001, contained provisions 
that negatively affected freedom of expression. These included excessive 
penalties for the publication of the state secret, for defamation, for insulting 
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a judge, a public prosecutor, or a member of the police force, for civil 
disobedience and for the profanation of state symbols. In 2002 both 
Freedom House and Amnesty International reported deterioration in 
freedom of the press in Moldova and identified domination of the ruling 
party as the main cause for it.18 The number of applications from Moldovan 
citizens to the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) has almost 
doubled in 2000 and 2001 in comparison to previous years.19  
In addition, a number of incompatible with international standards laws on 
media were adopted: they deliberately contained vague definitions, which 
allowed the authorities to easily manipulate the political system and further 
consolidate authoritarian power. For instance, in 1995 the Moldovan 
parliament passed the Law on Audiovisual Broadcasting. Interestingly 
enough, no European organization was involved in drafting the law. The law 
was so vague that after 1995 it went through a number of misinterpretations 
and misapplications as well as inadmissible interference by the legislative and 
executive branches.20 Surprisingly, despite such obvious limitations, there 
was hardly any reaction on the part of organizations. Representatives of 
several Moldovan NGOs dealing with human rights acknowledged the link 
between European organizations’ non-engagement and the low democratic 
quality of the law: ‘Without support from international institutions, we were 
on our own in protesting the law. The law would have been more 
meaningful if international institutions would have been involved’.21 The 
government’s position on this specific law changed, however, in 2002 when 
the CoE became directly involved with the issue and imposed explicit 
constraints on the authorities. 
In the second half of the 1990s the legislation process on freedoms of media 
and expression in Ukraine was also very slow. Some legislative acts, which 
would contain important provisions on freedoms of media and expression, 
were still missing, including a framework act on legal policy of Ukraine for 
protection of human rights, a new criminal code and code of criminal 
procedure, and a new law on political parties. Moreover, some media laws in 
Ukraine did not comply with international human rights standards and 
contained a number of serious shortcomings. For instance, the 1993 Law on 
Television and Radio Broadcasting contained too many vague definitions, 
gave too much power to legislative and executive branches of government in 
regulating broadcasting, and assigned a priority right to use national 
transmission networks to state broadcasters.22 Another illustrative case is the 
                                                 
18 See the 2002 FH’s report on freedom of the press in Moldova, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2002, 
accessed 13 March 2008.  See the 2002 AI report on human rights in 
Moldova, available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Mda-summary-
eng, accessed 13 March 2008. 
19 See the ECHR’s ‘Surveys of Activities 2002’, 33,  
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADA993B5-8591-
42BA-80F5-CD26A6E598B8/0/SurveyofActivities2002.pdf, accessed 15 
March 2008. 
20 Author’s interview with Raisa Apolschii, Parliamentary Advocate on 
Human Rights, 2003 to present, Chisinau, 16 June 2005. 
21 Author’s interview with Serghei Ostaf, Deputy Chairman of the 
Moldovan Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 26 June 2005, Chisinau; 
Author’s interview with Paul Strutzescu, Chairman, The League for Defence 
of Human Rights in Moldova (LADOM), Chisinau, 1 July 2005. 
22 See ‘Review and Analysis of Laws of Ukraine’ by Karol Jakubowicz,  
Chairman, the CoE’s Steering Committee on Media and New 
Communication Services, published by the OSCE’s Representative on 
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1998 Law on Coverage Procedure by Mass Media of the Performance of 
State Authorities and Local Self-Government. As an international human 
rights consultant indicated, the general approach of this law to freedom of 
expression was problematic and some provisions of the law were particularly 
harmful: for instance, rules on the accreditation of journalists, editorial 
independence, and the National Television Company and National Radio 
Company.23 
In addition, President Kuchma managed to pass a number of regulations 
that often changed the rules of the game in the media market and allowed 
for more efficient media manipulation. For instance, in June 1999 the 
Cabinet of Ministers increased tenfold the annual charge for using radio 
frequencies for the period 1 July – 31 December 1999. This regulation also 
made the procedure of obtaining permits for the use of transmitters very 
complicated, which led to several regional channels discontinuing 
broadcasting.24 In September 1998 the President signed another decree – 
‘On Improvement of State Management in the Area of Information’. 
Essentially, this decree established a state monopoly in the area of printing 
and distribution of publications – it provided for the creation of two state-
owned companies Ukrteleradio and Ukrpoligrafizdat, which held 100 per 
cent of the shares in the state publishing enterprises and TV and radio 
companies. As a result of this decree, several situations occurred where 
Ukrpoligrafizdat confiscated premises and property from local newspapers, 
or simply refused publication of more critically oriented newspapers.25  
For the period 1991-1999 Freedom House assigned Ukraine a score of 3 
(‘partly free’) for political rights, and a score of 4 (‘partly free’) for civil 
liberties.26 Moreover, the Political Rights score worsened and fell from 3 to 
4 in 2000-2004. A separate Freedom House measure for the independent 
media (available from 1997 onwards) in Ukraine for the period 1997-2003 
averaged at about 5, which puts Ukraine at the lowest range of the “partly 
free” category.27 Control and censorship of the media reached a new peak in 
1999, at the beginning of Kuchma’s re-election campaign. It seems very 
likely that Kuchma was at least indirectly involved in the murder of an 
independent journalist, Georgii Gongadze, in 2000.28 In November 2000 the 
                                                                                                         
Freedom of Media and Council of Europe, 
www.humanrights.coe.int/Media/atcm/2001/Ukraine/Analysis%20Jakubo
wicz%20%20(EN).rtf, accessed 16 April 2008. 
23 See ‘Analysis and Comments on Law of Ukraine on Coverage Procedure 
by the Mass Media of the Performance of State Authorities and Local Self-
Government Bodies in Ukraine’ by Lene Wendland, Consultant on Human 
Rights Law, published by, Geneva: 27 November 2001, pp.9-14. 
24 ‘Current situation of media in Ukraine’ by Freimut Duve, The 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OSCE, 1 March 2000, 2-3, 
available at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2000/03/2273_en.pdf, 
accessed 16 August 2008. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For more details about the Freedom House’s annual surveys, special 
reports and methodology, see http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 14 
September 2008. 
27 States are labelled as “not free” by Freedom House if the combined 
average of political rights and civil liberties ranges from 5.5 to 7.0. See 
http://www.freedomhouse.org for more details on methodology and annual 
surveys, accessed 14 September 2008. 
28 For a detailed journalistic investigation of Georgii Gongadze’s death see 
J.V. Koshiw, ‘Beheaded: The killing of a journalist’ (Artemia Press Ltd: 
Reading, UK; 2003). 
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Gongadze case ‘detonated’ a protest movement across Ukraine under the 
slogan “Ukraine Without Kuchma”, which was later labelled by scholars as 
the Kuchmagate crisis (Wilson 2005; Kuzio 2005; Way 2005). 
The regress in freedoms of the media in all three countries was noticed by 
the European organizations. Organizations gradually switched their policies 
and actions from indirect methods aimed to empower pro-democratic 
agents (individuals, political institutions, and civic organizations) through 
democratic socialization to more direct modes of involvement aimed at 
weakening and constraining autocratic agents in power. In some cases 
organizations imposed direct constraints on autocratic leaders which 
changed the balance of power between incumbents and challengers and 
prevented the full-scale consolidation of autocracy.  
In the Moldovan case involvement of European organizations in solving the 
standoff between the ruling communist party and the main opposition party 
(the Christian-Democratic Party of Moldova) in February and March of 
2002 provides a good illustration to this point. The political crisis intensified 
after 22 January 2002, when the government suspended the activities of the 
opposition Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD) for one month. In 
response, European organizations applied concerted pressure towards the 
Moldovan authorities. On 17 January the PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of 
the CoE) Chairman Lord Russell-Johnston met with President to discuss the 
matter, and on 30 January the European Commission urged the authorities 
to annul the suspension of PPCD.29 Initially there was no reaction from the 
government but only after the CoE demanded from the government to 
provide explanations on ‘how the restrictions on the PPCD comply with 
articles in the European Convention on Human Rights covering elections, 
freedom of thought, expression and organization’ by 22 February,30 the 
response from the authorities was quick to follow. Already on 8 February 
the one-month suspension of the PPCD was lifted and this allowed the 
PPCD to participate in electoral campaigning for the April 2002 local 
elections. The Justice Minister Ion Morei confirmed that this decision 
‘reflected a response to the concerns expressed by the CoE over the 
suspension’.31 Thus, organizations applied explicit constraints towards the 
authorities: clear deadlines were indicated for change of the government’s 
position, and secondly, implicit threats concerning Moldova’s membership 
in the COE and its compliance with the COE’s human rights acquis were 
voiced.32 
In March 2002 there was a new wave of protests on the streets on Chisinau. 
This time the main demands of the anti-communist demonstrators were the 
end of country’s ‘information blockade’ and, specifically, the transformation 
of Teleradio Moldova, the state-owned television and radio company into a 
national public service modelled on Western public broadcasters like the 
BBC. The Parliamentary Assembly of the COE (PACE), acting as mediator 
between the Communist government and the opposition, demanded 
immediate reforms of freedoms of expression and media, including 
transformation of Teleradio Moldova, in its Resolution 1280 of 24 April 
                                                 
29 RFE/RL Newsline, 31 January 2002, accessed 14 March 2008. 
30 RFE/RL Newsline, 5 February 2002, accessed 14 March 2008. 
31 RFE/RL Newsline, 11 February 2002, accessed 15 March 2008. 
32 At the same time a more explicit threat of Moldova’s COE membership 
withdrawal was expressed by the deputy chairman of the CoE’s Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities, Claude Casagrande, who criticised the new 
law on administrative division and, in general, the dominant position of the 
governmental party on the domestic scene. See RFE/RL Newsline, 30 
January 2002, accessed 1 April 2008. 
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2002 and explicitly requested completion of these reforms by 31 July 2002.33 
In March and April 2002 the OSCE Chairman in Office Jaime Gama 
expressed on several occasions concerns about confrontation between the 
government and protesters and ‘called on both sides to show restraint and 
engage in dialogue’.34 It is also noteworthy that these organizations’ 
demands were fully backed by the USAID, the largest bilateral donor in 
Moldova: on 20 March 2002 the U.S. Foreign Minister Colin Powell also 
threatened to stop all U.S. programmes of technical assistance to Moldova, 
as well as those assisting Moldova in its relations with international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and for achieving European integration in case of non-
compliance with organizations’ demands.35  
On the 26 July 2002, 5 days before the expiration of the deadline set by the 
CoE, a new law on the national public broadcasting company Teleradio-
Moldova was adopted, opposition was given a prime time slot on the 
national television channel for preparing its own programme, as well as free 
space in the national press. Discussion above shows that European 
organizations and other external actors were able to influence domestic 
policy-making process only when they opted for imposition of explicit 
constraints on the authorities. Crucially, such direct and concerted action on 
the part of external actors interfered with the authorities’ plans to impose 
stricter media control and reduce availability of collective action resources 
for the opposition.  
Similarly, the Ukrainian authorities were more receptive to European 
organizations when they explicitly demanded media reforms and exercised 
credible threats towards the authorities. For instance, in its December 1998 
report on ‘Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States’ 
the CoE criticised the authorities for serious interference with freedom of 
expression through the imposition of unfair financial penalties and outright 
closure of newspapers that were critical of the President and his 
administration.36 The report also argued that the significant control by the 
state over the media encouraged censorship, and libel and defamation suits 
became effective means of intimidating journalists.37 The CoE PACE 
reporters Severinsen and Kelam concluded that Ukraine had not made 
substantial progress in honouring its obligations as a member state of the 
Council and proposed a number of constraining measures: continuation of 
the CoE’s monitoring procedure of Ukraine, adoption of a resolution to bar 
the Ukrainian delegation and suspension of its representatives from the 
Council’s Committee of Ministers unless such progress had been made by 
the time of the June 1999 PACE session.  
The PACE reporters, Kelam and Severinsen, undertook another fact-finding 
visit to Kyiv on 9-12 May 1999 and found that no progress had been 
achieved between January and April 1999.38 Remarkably, already on 14 May 
                                                 
33 Resolution 1280 (2002) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, 24 
April 2002 (available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1280.htm), 
accessed 1 May 2008. 
34 RFE/RL Newsline, 27 March 2002 and 8 April 2002, accessed 1 May 2008. 
35 RFE/RL Newsline, 28 March 2002, accessed 1 May 2008. 
36 Council of Europe press release, 30 March 1998; Holos Ukrainy 1 April 
1998 as cited in Bojcun 2001, 43. 
37 Kelam and Severinsen,  as cited in Bojcun 2001, 44. 
38 ‘Report on honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine’, by 
Mr. Tunne Kelam and Mrs. Hanne Severinsen, PACE, Doc. 8424, June 
1999, available at 
 17 
1999, a few days after the PACE reporters had left Ukraine, the speaker of 
the Ukrainian legislature gave direct instructions to the parliamentary 
committee for human rights, national minorities and interethnic relations to 
prepare a draft bill ‘On the Basis for the State Policy of Ukraine in the Field 
of Human Rights’ for consideration by the legislature, Verkhovna Rada. On 
17 June 1999 (4 days before the initial deadline of 21 June 1999, set out by 
the PACE in its January 1999 Resolution No.1179, expired)39 the Rada 
adopted a framework act on Ukraine’s legal policy of human rights.  
The situation repeated in April 2001 when the CoE adopted a new 
resolution on Ukraine, in which it made similar threats of possible expulsion 
from the CoE and gave a new deadline for reforms of freedoms of the 
media and expression: the June 2001 session.40 And again the authorities 
complied with requirements and adopted a new Criminal Code in April 
2001: the new Criminal Code represented an important step in protection of 
journalists in Ukraine because it introduced harsher punishments against 
those convicted of harassing or persecuting journalists. Thus, these two 
particular cases show that the CoE gained more leverage over the pace of 
human rights reforms in Ukraine when it started formulating precise tasks 
and setting concrete deadlines for their fulfilment.  
However, in the early 2000s the state’s intervention in the media’s coverage 
of daily events and news became more frequent and blunt. Almost half of 
the 727 Ukrainian journalists polled in November 2002 believed that 
physical retaliation by criminal elements or the state authorities was possible 
with the publication of critical materials.41 In its 2002 Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index, the international NGO ‘Reporters Without Borders’ listed 
Ukraine 112th out of 139 countries in terms of journalistic freedom and 
government efforts to guarantee freedom of expression.42 This rapid 
deterioration in political rights and civil freedoms indicate that European 
organizations did not influence the domestic policy process much.  
Certainly, domestic factors such as increasing abilities of the autocratic 
incumbent to control the state, weakness and lack of unity among domestic 
opposition forces account well for the country’s backslide towards full 
autocracy. However, as a number of authors indicate, the organizations’ 
democracy promotion strategies played a certain negative role too: their 
policies and actions were rather declaratory and not very credible for the 
domestic ruling elites (Kubicek 2005; Pavliuk 2001a and 2001b; Wolczuk 
2003). For instance, in June 1999 the CoE did not fulfil its earlier threat 
(made in January 1999) to start the suspension procedure of Ukraine from 
its right of representation in the Committee of Ministers if no progress in 
                                                                                                         
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc99/EDOC8424.ht
m , accessed 23 September 2008. 
39 See PACE Resolution 1179 on the honouring of obligations and 
commitments by Ukraine, 27 January 1999, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/E
RES1179.htm, accessed 10 September 2008. 
40 See PACE Resolution 1244, adopted on 26 April 2001, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/ERES1244.htm , 
accessed 5 September 2008. 
41 Freedom House Special Report 2004, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=17, 
accessed 5 May 2009. 
42 See Reporters Without Borders. ‘Press Freedom Index’, October 2002, 
available at http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=4118, accessed 1 
October 2008. 
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honouring commitments was made43 and decided to give the authorities 
more time. The EU’s High Representative for its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana, pointed out in an interview to a Ukrainian 
newspaper in 2000 – just before the Kuchmagate scandal broke – that ‘over 
the years, Ukraine has committed itself to moving towards a fully 
functioning democracy, and the results are already very clear to see’.44 A 
joint statement from the EU-Ukraine Summit in September 2001 did not 
mention the murdered journalist Georgii Gongadze by name, while praising 
Kuchma’s own commitments to the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy.45 Surprisingly, in summer 2001, at the peak of the Kuchmagate 
crisis, there had been no discussion of a cut-off or curtailment in democracy 
aid to Ukraine (Kubicek 2005, p.279). Therefore, European organizations 
did not employ constraints towards autocratic ruling elites in a systematic 
manner, which undermined their credibility and made continuation of the 
autocratic rule by Kuchma less costly.  
The case of Belarus is especially interesting when discussing the role of 
credible and direct external constraints. As a response to Lukashenka’s 
actions to consolidate autocratic power, the CoE suspended Belarus’s 
special guest status on 13 January 1997. Intergovernmental activities to assist 
the approximation of Belarusian legislation to CoE’s standards were 
discontinued, and Belarus was not invited to the Second Summit of the CoE 
in Strasbourg in October 1997. The EU adopted a similar to the CoE’s 
approach: it did not recognise the 1996 constitution of Belarus, and political 
ties between the EU and Belarus were effectively suspended. In 1997 the 
EU Council of Ministers decided on a number of explicit sanctions: the 
PCA (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement) was not to be ratified along 
with the 1996 interim agreement on trade, Belarusian membership of the 
CoE was not supported, bilateral relations at ministerial level were 
suspended, and EU technical assistance programmes were frozen. The 
OSCE has largely echoed the EU’s and the CoE’s reactions and also 
explicitly condemned unlawful change of the Belarusian constitution 
initiated by Lukashenko.  
However, these explicit strategies of constraining an autocratic incumbent 
and preventing further consolidation of authoritarian power failed to change 
the status quo and improve situation with civil and political rights in Belarus. 
Moreover, continuation of external activities aimed at empowerment of 
potential democratic challengers was not fruitful either. For instance, in 
contrast to the EU’s and CoE’s refusals to co-operate further with the 
Belarusian authorities, the OSCE continued to be present on Belarusian 
political scene after the 1996 referendum. In 1997 the OSCE established its 
Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) in Minsk with a mandate to train 
and consult the Belarusian authorities on electoral and human rights 
legislation, to monitor and report on political events and situation with 
human rights, and, crucially, to work out political compromise between the 
authorities and the opposition. Unfortunately, the AMG’s efforts to 
empower democratic agents in Belarus failed to produce any visible results. 
The situation with media freedoms has not changed and even worsened: the 
                                                 
43  See PACE Resolution 1179 on the honouring of obligations and 
commitments by Ukraine, 27 January 1999, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/E
RES1179.htm, accessed 12 April 2009. 
44 Zerkalo nedeli (Kyiv), 2000 as cited in Kubicek 2005, p. 279 
45 Joint Statement of EU-Ukraine Summit, 11 September 2001, available 
from http://www.europexxi.ua/english/index.html as cited in Kubicek 
2005, 279. 
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most common problems appeared to be direct censorship by the state 
institutions, seizure of equipment, massive inspections, interference in 
editorial independence and, above all, criminal charges and reprimand. The 
AMG’s negotiations with the government turned out to be controversial and 
culminated in a public clash between the Head of the AMG Office in Minsk, 
Hans-Georg Wieck, and President Lukashanka in May 2000 (Wieck in Lewis 
(ed.) 2002, p. 270). After a number of diplomatic scandals between the two 
sides the activities of the AMG in Belarus practically came to a standstill in 
the early 2000s.  
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This article set out to evaluate experiences and effects of external democracy 
promotion in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The main aim was to explore 
whether external actors influenced domestic processes of political change in 
these three countries and to analyse more closely operation of two causal 
mechanisms – empowerment of pro-democratic agents and imposition of 
constraints on autocratic agents – through which external actors interact 
with domestic actors and exert their influence.  
The analysis produced three major findings. First, the paper’s findings are 
consistent with the recent trend emphasizing external factors in studies of 
domestic political change and democratization (Brinks and Coppenge 2006; 
Gleditch 2002; Pevehouse 2005; Whitehead; Finkel et al. 2007). On 
numerous occasions European organisations were active and effective 
participants in the domestic policy process. Evidence has shown that 
organisations were able to exert influence on domestic governments and 
bring about the organisations’ preferred policy outcomes. More importantly, 
governments tried to or in some cases did adopt undemocratic laws when 
organisations were not involved. When organizations interfered more 
actively, the governments reversed their policies. Thus, the finding of 
democracy promotion effects supports theoretical idea of both external and 
agent-based sources of democratic change.  
Second, it seems that two causal mechanisms that facilitated interaction 
between external and internal actors produced different effects on domestic 
policy change. Organizations’ democracy promotion activities aimed at 
empowerment of pro-democratic agents (both in the ruling circles and in 
opposition) were less effective than the ones aimed at weakening and 
constraining autocratic agents. Empirical analysis shows that softer, 
socialization-based democracy promotion activities aimed at teaching and 
persuading, and, therefore, empowering domestic actors to adhere to 
democratic behaviour failed to cause significant policy changes. A lot of 
training and twinning programmes have been organised for local journalists, 
politicians and members of civic organizations, and a vast amount of legal 
expertise was provided. But deterioration of civil and political freedoms in 
all three countries in the second half of the 1990s demonstrates that these 
softer democracy promotion activities did not empower domestic 
democratic agents sufficiently in order to counteract rising autocratic power. 
In contrast, European organisations could influence domestic policy more 
effectively only when they applied direct and explicit constraints on 
autocratic incumbents. Thus, European organizations’ constraints imposed 
on the Moldovan authorities during the political standoff with the 
opposition in the early 2000s were of crucial importance: suspension of the 
oppositionist party was lifted and the government complied with 
organizations’ demands to pursue legislative reforms on freedoms of media. 
Similarly, in Ukraine adoption of long-awaited legislation or amendment of 
 20 
the existing undemocratic legislation happened only after organizations, 
primarily the CoE, explicitly put pressure on autocratic authorities.  
A note on operation of casual mechanisms is necessary. The two causal 
mechanisms under consideration are not mutually exclusive. Most likely, any 
democracy promotion process includes both: empowerment of pro-
democratic agents and imposition of constraints on autocratic agents occur 
simultaneously in any democracy promotion process. That is, by 
empowering pro-democratic agents external actors also put certain limits on 
state power (thus, making consolidation of autocratic power less probable), 
and vice versa, by imposing constraints on autocratic agents external actors 
facilitate development of democratic forces in a society. But the fact that 
policy changes occurred only when organisations issued explicit warnings 
and set out concrete deadlines for policy reforms indicates that causal 
impact of the constraints mechanism was greater than that of the 
empowerment mechanism.  
The third finding of the paper relates to the role of domestic factors. 
Without a doubt, given peculiarities of competitive authoritarian domestic 
regimes that emerged in most of the post-Soviet states, domestic variables 
should be ascribed primary explanatory role in affecting outcomes of 
political change in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in the 1990s-early 2000s. 
At best, external actors play secondary or intervening role that is 
conditioned to a great extent by domestic factors. In some cases (primarily 
in Moldova and Ukraine), due to more competitive nature of authoritarian 
regimes and more vulnerable position of autocratic incumbents in both the 
domestic and international scenes, organizations were able to overcome 
growing power of autocratic incumbents and impede the full-scale 
consolidation of autocracy. In other cases, however, external actors were 
powerless. The Belarusian case illustrates this point well. Increasing capacity 
of the autocratic incumbent, severity of the government’s repression of 
opponents, the government’s unchallenged domination over all aspects of 
political, economic and social life provide solid explanations for Belarus’s 
authoritarian backslide. European organizations were not able to initiate 
shifts in the distribution of power between autocratic incumbents and 
democratic challengers either via empowerment of the latter, or imposition 
of constraints on the former.  
 Important policy lessons for those more optimistic about effects of 
democracy promotion are to be learned from this article. The most 
important question from the policy perspective is not whether external 
democracy promotion works or not, but, rather, when and how external 
actors can influence domestic processes and, hence, promote democratic 
development. Careful consideration of domestic contexts is crucial here. It is 
certainly impossible to impose or manufacture democracy from the outside. 
But external actors’ constructive engagement with autocratic incumbents is 
absolutely necessary in order to prevent a full-scale consolidation of 
autocracy. Thus, in the context of more vulnerable competitive authoritarian 
regimes external policies aimed at weakening and constraining of autocratic 
agents rather than policies aimed at teaching and socializing domestic actors 
into democratic practices represent a more efficient way to influence 
domestic policy change from the outside.  
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